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1. Introduction 
Over the last half century, since the seminal work of Kuznets (1955), there has emerged a 
vast and well-development literature on the theory and empirical studies of income inequality, 
though the controversy is still pervasive. Empirical support for the existence of substantial income 
inequality and their importance in generating social, political and economic instabilities has made 
the introduction of such variables into models of macroeconomics the prevalent and accepted way 
of modeling social instability. Given the broad interest in studying the effects of income inequality 
on macroeconomic aggregates and its determinants, economists have been constructing and testing 
all kinds of theoretical models and empirical studies. However, the questions in the theoretical 
models and empirics are far from settled. The popular approach now is to use the share of total 
income accruing to some parts of the top income holders, such as the top 10% group, to measure 
the income concentration (see, e.g., Piketty and Saez, 2014). Some other papers are more prone to 
use some indexes, such as the Gini coefficient, to gauge the overall inequality; see Anand and 
Segal (2008) for an excellent discussing of the methodological issues on the measurement of 
global inequality. A comparison between these two strands of measures, see Alvaredo (2011). 
Unfortunately, these papers do not discuss what types of income distributions will unite efficiency 
and fairness, provided that the latter ensures social stability. In this paper, we introduce Rawls’ 
fairness considerations into general equilibrium model to study its implications for the statistical 
distribution of income for a competitive economy. Then, based on the income distribution, we try 
to derive the secure scope of the Gini coefficient. 
The motivation for introducing Rawls’ fairness considerations comes from experimental, 
empirical studies etc, which provide a wealth of evidence supporting the assumption or idea of the 
fair equality of opportunity (Bolton et al., 2005). Although some evidence indicates that allocation 
fairness and procedural fairness are linked in important ways, they are conceptually distinct. A 
considerable amount of work has been directed at allocation fairness (Kagel and Roth, 1995), and 
the critical finding is that fair outcomes are often enforced by resistance to unfair outcomes. There 
is also substantial evidence showing that how individuals view inequality and redistribution is 
heavily influenced by the perceived source of inequality, see, e.g., Benabou and Tirole (2006), and 
Durante et al. (2014). Ku and Salmon (2013) show that individuals' willingness to accept higher 
but more unequal outcomes depends on the source of the initial inequality and random assignment 
leads to the most tolerance for disadvantageous inequality. However, considering the theme in this 
paper we focused on, we are trying to seek the income distributions with the highest probability 
from the long-run competitive process, rather than analyze the ultimate competitive outcomes. So, 
the focal point in this paper is centered on the procedural fairness. 
Our baseline model is a standard general equilibrium model with consumers and firms. In 
that framework, due to the free entry assumption there are multiple equilibria in the economy. To 
that framework, we incorporate Rawls’ fairness, as an additional consideration, into the model to 
seek the income distribution with the highest probability from the long-run competitive 
equilibrium allocations. Once we get the statistical distribution of the income, we can derive the 
corresponding Gini coefficient. There are many ways to express and calculate the Gini coefficient 
from the individual data (see, e.g., Dorfman (1979); Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000); Xu (2000, 
2007); Barrett and Donald (2009)). However, the most of the calculations depend on the income 
distribution, if the income distribution of the total population is not available, the estimation will 
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not be precise. Unlike the previous mentioned papers, in this paper, we will derive the statistical 
distribution of the income under rigid economic theory. 
The Gini coefficient is commonly used as a measure of inequality of income distribution 
between a nation’s residents. It is defined as a ratio with values between 0 and 1, the larger the 
value, the higher the inequality and vice versa. A Gini coefficient of zero corresponds to perfect 
income equality, where everyone has an exactly the same income; meanwhile, one corresponds to 
perfect income inequality, i.e. one person has all the income, while everyone else has zero income. 
Since the income inequality is often regarded as the cause of social instability, the Gini coefficient 
is naturally identified as the early-warning signal.  
For a long time, the international institutions, such as the World Bank, UN, and the news 
media, etc, accept that the alarming level of Gini coefficient should be set at 0.4 (UNRISD, 2013). 
Some authors also implicitly hint that 0.4 is a critical value of the Gini coefficient for the more 
developed countries (MDCs) (Biancotti, 2006). This means that if the Gini coefficient of one 
country exceeds 0.4, it may confront the risk of overall social instability. However, in the 
economics profession, economists even cannot make clear where this alarming level come from! 
Indeed, such an alarming level is not developed on the basis of any available and convincing 
economic theories, let alone on rigid empirical tests.  
It is well known that, Arrow-Debreu’s general equilibrium model can be regarded as the 
standard tool for dealing with the optimal resource allocation among social members. The basic 
proposition is: Competitive equilibrium corresponds to the equilibrium income allocation. By the 
first fundamental theorem of welfare economics, the competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal, so 
is the equilibrium income allocation. Nevertheless, “Pareto optimality” does not necessarily imply 
the existence of “fairness”. A Pareto optimal allocation may be very unfair (Pazner and Schmeidler, 
1974; Alesina et al., 2005; Alesina et al., 2012). Due to this disappointing result, some welfare 
economists suggest that searching the best equilibrium income allocation through a so-called 
social welfare function that reflects collective preferences in a society. Unfortunately, Arrow’s 
Impossibility Theorem refuses the existence of such a social welfare function (Arrow, 1963). This 
is just the well-known “dilemma of social choice”.   
Although Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem casts a shadow on the availability of democratic 
decision, Rawls (1999) opened another fascinating outlet to deal with the problem of social 
fairness. To guarantee social fairness, Rawls (1999) introduces the principle of equal liberty and 
the principle of fair equality of opportunity. The first principle governs the assignment of rights 
and duties, while the second governs the distribution of income and wealth. In this paper, we 
attempt to incorporate Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity into Arrow-Debreu’s 
general equilibrium model. Our purpose is to seek an income distribution which not only satisfies 
Pareto optimality but also obeys Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity. Since such an 
income distribution ensures both efficiency and fairness, we can specify the maximal value of the 
corresponding Gini coefficient as a possible alarming level. 
To get some intuition, we simply present the basic idea of our method here. Assuming that a 
competitive economy produces four equilibrium income allocations {𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝐴3, 𝐴4}, each of them 
is Pareto optimal. Meanwhile, we further assume that these four equilibrium allocations can be 
divided into the following three income distributions: 𝑎1 = {𝐴1}, 𝑎2 = {𝐴2, 𝐴3} and 𝑎3 = {𝐴4}. 
By Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity, we know that each equilibrium allocation 
occurs with an equal probability 1 4⁄  (Tao 2013), then we conclude that 𝑎1 occurs with the 
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probability 1 4⁄ , 𝑎2 occurs with the probability 1 2⁄ , and 𝑎3 occurs with the probability 1 4⁄ . 
This means that the income distribution 𝑎2 occurs with the highest probability, so it can be 
regarded as a “certain event” in a just society1. It is easy to show that income distribution 𝑎2 not 
only satisfies Pareto optimality but also obeys Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity: 
Because 𝐴2 and 𝐴3 are Pareto optimal, 𝑎2 = {𝐴2, 𝐴3} is also Pareto optimal. The probability 
of the occurrence of 𝑎2 is the largest can be resorted to the Rawls’ principle of fair equality of 
opportunity. 
To sum up, one can use three steps to seek the income distribution with the highest 
probability (Tao 2013). First, try to find all possible equilibrium income allocations of a 
competitive economy. Second, divide all these equilibrium income allocations into different 
income distributions. Finally, find the income distribution which contains the most equilibrium 
income allocations, which occurs with the highest probability. The main purpose of this paper is to 
seek the income distribution with the highest probability in a long-run competitive economy using 
the three steps stated above, and then specify the maximal value of the Gini coefficient of this 
income distribution as a possible alarming level. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the long-run competitive equilibrium 
under the framework of Arrow-Debreu economy, and proves that the long-run competitive 
economy will produce multiple equilibrium income allocations. Section 3 introduces the Rawls’ 
principle of fair equality of opportunity to the model, and divides the equilibrium income 
allocations into different income distributions. Section 4 shows that the income distribution with 
the highest probability in the long-run competitive economy follows an exponential distribution, 
and meanwhile, we find that it leads to a possible alarming level of Gini coefficient specified at 
least equal or larger than 0.5. Section 5 describes our data set, empirical methods, and presents 
some evidence that support the theoretical predictions of our model. Finally, section 6 sums up the 
results and concludes. 
2. The model 
The basic model we propose to understand the income distribution combines the behavior of 
firms and consumers under the general equilibrium framework. The quite standard microeconomic 
tools are discussed in detail in Tao (2013). The novel features of our model are that the 
introduction of a framework for exploring the income distributions between heterogeneous agents, 
and incorporating fairness into the derivation of income distribution. We first show the existence 
of long-run competitive equilibria and later reformulate them in the form of income allocations. 
2.1 Assumptions 
Following the framework of neoclassical economics2 (Mas-Collel et al., 1995; Page 579), we 
assume that there are 𝑁 consumers, 𝑁 firms and 𝐿 types of commodities in the economy.  
2.1.1 Consumers 
The basic assumptions of the consumer behavior are as follows: 
                                                        
1 If the number of the equilibrium allocations is large enough, then the “highest probability” tends to 1. Then the 
income distribution with the highest probability is indeed a “certain event” in a just society. 
2 Our model is undoubtedly a special case of Arrow-Debreu’s general equilibrium model, since we have assumed 
that the number of firms equals the number of consumers. 
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(a) Each consumer 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 faces with some possible consumption bundles in some set, 
the consumption set 𝑋𝑖 ⊂ 𝑅
𝐿, 𝑋𝑖 is closed, convex, and bounded below. There is no satiation 
consumption bundle for any consumer. We denote the consumption vector of the 𝑖th consumer by 
𝑥𝑖 = (𝑥1𝑖 , … , 𝑥𝐿𝑖), where 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑥𝑘𝑖 ≥ 0 for 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐿. 
(b) A preference relation ≻
∼ 𝑖
 defined on 𝑋𝑖. For each consumer, the sets {𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑋𝑖|𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑖
′
∼𝑖
≻ } and 
{𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑋𝑖|𝑥𝑖
′ 𝑥𝑖∼𝑖
≻ } are closed. 
(c) If 𝑥𝑖
1 and 𝑥𝑖
2 are two arbitrary points in 𝑋𝑖, and 𝑡 ∈ (0,1), then 𝑥𝑖
2 𝑥𝑖
1
∼𝑖
≻  implies that 
𝑡𝑥𝑖
2 + (1 − 𝑡)𝑥𝑖
1 𝑥𝑖
1
𝑖
≻ . 
(d) There is 𝑥𝑖
0 in 𝑋𝑖, such that 𝑥𝑖
0 ≪ 𝜔𝑖, where the 𝜔𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝐿 is an initial endowment vector 
for the consumer 𝑖.  
2.1.2 Firms 
The basic assumptions of the firms are as follows: 
(e) Each firm 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁  is endowed with a production set 𝑌𝑗 ⊂ 𝑅
𝐿 . We denote the 
production vector of the 𝑗th firm by 𝑦𝑗 = (𝑦1𝑗 , … , 𝑦𝐿𝑗), where 𝑦𝑗 ∈ 𝑌𝑗. 
(f) 0 ∈ 𝑌𝑗.  
(g) 𝑌 = ∑ 𝑌𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  is closed and convex. 
(h) −𝑌 ∩ 𝑌 = {0}. 
(i) −𝑅+
𝐿 ⊂ 𝑌. 
Since our purpose is to use Arrow-Debreu’s general equilibrium model (ADGEM, hereafter) to 
deal with the income allocation problem between consumers, we need to make the following two 
extra assumptions:  
(j). Without loss of generality, we assume that all the firms only produce the 𝑚th type of 
commodity, namely 𝑦𝑚𝑗 ≥ 0 for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁 and 𝑦𝑙𝑗 ≤ 0 for 𝑙 ≠ 𝑚. The implication of such 
an assumption is that there is only one industry in the economy. 
(k). We assume that the 𝑖th consumer is the owner of the 𝑖th firm, so the revenue of the 𝑖th 
firm is the income of the 𝑖th consumer, where 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁.  
Besides the assumptions (a) to (i), the production technology satisfies additivity and public 
available technology, that is, 𝑌𝑗 + 𝑌𝑗 ⊂ 𝑌𝑗, for any 𝑗, and 𝑌1 = 𝑌2 =. . . 𝑌𝑁. The implications of 
additivity and public available technology see assumption 3.1 and assumption 3.2 in Tao (2013). 
Tao (2013) has shown that ADGEM with additivity and publicly available technology has multiple 
equilibria, and can be identified with the long-run competitive economy. From now on we will 
always call ADGEM with additivity and publicly available technology the long-run competitive 
economy. In accordance with Piketty and Saez (2014), who study the long-run evolutionary 
process of the income inequality, we also consider the long-run features of income distribution in 
this paper. So, in this regard, it is the long-run competitive economy that we considered. 
2.2 Long-run competitive equilibria 
In the spirit of Marshall, long-run competition is identified with free entry. Because free entry 
implies that equilibrium profit of any firm is zero (Varian, 1992, 2003), Tao (2013) proposes the 
following definition of the long-run competitive equilibria: 
Definition 1: An allocation (𝑥1
∗, … , 𝑥𝑁
∗ ; 𝑦1
∗, … , 𝑦𝑁
∗ )  and a price vector 𝑃 = (𝑃1, … , 𝑃𝐿) 
constitute a long-run competitive equilibrium if the following three conditions are satisfied: 
   (1). Profit maximization: For each firm 𝑖, there exists 𝑦𝑖
∗ ∈ 𝑌𝑖 such that 𝑃 ∙ 𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝑃 ∙ 𝑦𝑖
∗ = 0 
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for all 𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖. 
   (2). Utility maximization: For each consumer 𝑖, 𝑥𝑖
∗ ∈ 𝑋𝑖 is the solution of maximizing the 
preference ≻
∼ 𝑖
 under the budget set: {𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑋𝑖: 𝑃 ∙ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑃 ∙ 𝜔𝑖}. 
   (3). Market clearing: ∑ 𝑥𝑖
∗𝑁
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝜔𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑦𝑖
∗𝑁
𝑖=1 . 
 We now give the following crucial propositions. 
Proposition 1: If the assumptions (a) to (i) are satisfied, long run competitive economy has 
multiple equilibria: 
(𝑥1
∗, … , 𝑥𝑁
∗ ; 𝑦1
∗(𝑡1), … , 𝑦𝑁
∗ (𝑡𝑁)),                                              (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖
∗(𝑡𝑖) = 𝑡𝑖𝑧
∗ for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁, meanwhile 𝑥𝑖
∗ for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 and 𝑧∗ = (𝑧1
∗, … , 𝑧𝐿
∗) are 
fixed vectors. 
Moreover, {𝑡𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑁  satisfies: 
𝑡𝑖 ≥ 0, for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁, subject to ∑ 𝑡𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 1.                                 (2) 
The 𝑧∗ is called the total production vector and obeys the equality: 
𝑃 ∙ 𝑧∗ = 0.                                                               (3) 
Proof. By Proposition 3.3 in Tao (2013) completes this proof. □ 
Proposition 2: Each of the multiple equilibrium states in equation (1) is Pareto optimal. 
Proof. By first fundamental theorem of welfare economics we immediately get the result. □ 
2.3 Equilibrium income allocations 
Equation (1) and (3) together illustrate that each firm 𝑖 in the long-run equilibria only 
obtains zero economic profit. Then by assumption (j) and 𝑦𝑖
∗(𝑡𝑖) = 𝑡𝑖𝑧
∗ for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁, the 𝑖th 
firm will obtain 𝑡𝑖𝑃𝑚𝑧𝑚
∗  units of revenue, where 𝑧𝑚
∗  denotes the 𝑚th component of 𝑧∗. By 
assumption (k) the consumer 𝑖 is the owner of the firm 𝑖, so the consumer 𝑖 will obtain 𝑡𝑖𝑃𝑚𝑧𝑚
∗   
units of income. Therefore, the equilibrium income allocation among 𝑁 consumers can be 
written in the form: 
 (𝑡1𝑃𝑚𝑧𝑚
∗ , … , 𝑡𝑁𝑃𝑚𝑧𝑚
∗ ).                                                   (4) 
If we denote the total income by 𝛱 = 𝑃𝑚𝑧𝑚
∗ , the equilibrium income allocations 
(𝑡1𝑃𝑚𝑧𝑚
∗ , … , 𝑡𝑁𝑃𝑚𝑧𝑚
∗ ) can be directly written as: 
 (𝑅1, 𝑅2, … , 𝑅𝑁),                                                        (5) 
where 𝑅𝑖 denotes the income of the 𝑖th consumer and by equation (2) it satisfies: 
 𝑅𝑖 ≥ 0, for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁, with ∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝛱.                                  (6) 
Undoubtedly, by Proposition 2, we know that any equilibrium income allocation satisfying 
equation (5) and (6) is Pareto optimal. In fact, equation (5) and (6) will be the starting point of the 
following discussions. 
3. Fairness axiom and income distribution 
In section 2, we have shown that, equation (5) and (6), the long-run competitive economy 
will produce multiple equilibrium allocations, and proposition 2 indicates that each of the 
equilibrium allocations is Pareto optimal. However, “Pareto optimality” does not imply “fairness”. 
For example, the equilibrium income allocation (𝛱, 0, … ,0) satisfies equation (6), but it also 
indicates maximal inequality (one consumer holds all income 𝛱). To avoid such a dilemma, some 
welfare economists propose searching the best equilibrium income allocation outcome by making 
use of a so-called social welfare function, which aggregates individual preferences. Unfortunately, 
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Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem refused the existence of the social welfare function (Jehle and 
Reny, 2001; Page 243).  
3.1 Fairness axiom 
Although Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem casted a shadow on the availability of democratic 
decision, Rawls (1999) opened another fascinating outlet to deal with the problem of social 
fairness. Rawls argued that a just economy can be regarded as a fair procedure which will translate 
its fairness to the (equilibrium) outcomes, so that every social member is indifferent between these 
outcomes. With this idea, Rawls (1999; Page 76) introduced the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity. This principle indicates that each equilibrium outcome of a fair economy should be 
selected with equal opportunities as collective decisions3, to go one step further, Rawls’ principle 
of fair equality of opportunity can be expressed as the following fairness axiom (Tao 2013): 
Axiom 1: If a competitive economy produces 𝜔 equilibrium income allocations, and at the 
same time, the economy is absolutely fair, then each equilibrium income allocation occurs with an 
equal probability 1 𝜔⁄ . 
Now we show that, by the Fairness Axiom 1, an income distribution with the highest 
probability not only satisfies Pareto optimality but also obeys Rawls’ principle of fair equality of 
opportunity. To this end, we consider a simple case where a long-run competitive economy 
produces a set of equilibrium allocations {𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝐴3, 𝐴4}, each of them is Pareto optimal. We 
further assume that these four equilibrium allocations can be divided into the following three kinds 
of income distributions4: 𝑎1 = {𝐴1}, 𝑎2 = {𝐴2, 𝐴3} and 𝑎3 = {𝐴4}. Then by the fairness axiom 
1, we know that each equilibrium allocation occurs with the probability 1 4⁄ , so we conclude that 
𝑎1 also occurs with the probability 1 4⁄ , by the same token, 𝑎2 occurs with the probability 1 2⁄ , 
while 𝑎3 occurs with the probability 1 4⁄ . Clearly, the income distribution 𝑎2 occurs with the 
highest probability, so it can be regarded as the “certain event” in a just society5. It is easy to show 
that 𝑎2 satisfies Pareto optimality and obeys Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity
6. 
3.2 Income distribution 
In this section, we will concentrate our attention on the long-run competitive economy. The 
discussion proposed in section 3.1 implies that by the Fairness Axiom 1 we can use three steps to 
seek the income distribution with the highest probability. First, try to find all possible equilibrium 
income allocations of a competitive economy. Second, divide all these equilibrium income 
allocations into different income distributions. Finally, find the income distribution containing the 
most equilibrium income allocations, which occurs with the highest probability. 
To apply the Fairness Axiom 1 into the long-run competitive economy, we must divide the 
multiple equilibrium allocations (5) into different income distributions. By the method proposed in 
Appendix A, the multiple equilibrium allocations (5) can be divided into different income 
distributions {𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 , which follows the following definition: 
                                                        
3 By (5) and (6) this means that every social member will have an equal chance of occupying any given income 
level. 
4 𝑎1 = {𝐴1} represents an income distribution when equilibrium allocation 𝐴1 occurs. Likewise, 𝑎2 = {𝐴2, 𝐴3} 
and 𝑎3 = {𝐴4} are defined in the same way. Concrete example sees the Example 1 in Appendix A. 
5 Here we only consider a simple case with four equilibrium allocations. In fact, if the number of the equilibrium 
allocations is large enough, then the “highest probability” will tend to 1. 
6 Because 𝐴2 and 𝐴3 are Pareto optimal, 𝑎2 = {𝐴2, 𝐴3} is of course Pareto optimal as well. 𝑎2 occurs with 
the largest probability dues to the Fairness Axiom 1, so it obeys Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity. 
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Definition 2: We denote the set of all possible equilibrium income allocations satisfying 
equation (5) and (6) by 𝑊. We call the non-negative number sequence, {𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 = {𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛}, 
an income distribution if and only if it is a subset of 𝑊, as well as obeys the following four 
conventions: 
(1). There are totally 𝑛 possible income levels in the economy: 𝜀1 < 𝜀2 < ⋯ < 𝜀𝑛; 
(2). There are 𝑎𝑘 consumers, each of them obtains 𝜀𝑘 units of income, where 𝑘 ranges 
from 1 to 𝑛; 
(3). ∑ 𝑎𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 = 𝑁; 
(4). ∑ 𝑎𝑘𝜀𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 = 𝛱. 
For a given income distribution {𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 , we immediately know that, there are 𝑎1 consumers, 
each of them obtains 𝜀1 units of income, while for the 𝑎2 consumers, each of them obtains 𝜀2 
units of income, … , and so on. 
The Appendix A further shows that a given income distribution {𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛  contains 
𝛺({𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 ) equilibrium income allocations, where 𝛺({𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 ) is denoted by: 
{
𝛺({𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 ) =
𝑁!
∏ 𝑎𝑘!
𝑛
𝑘=1
∑ 𝑎𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 = 𝑁
∑ 𝑎𝑘𝜀𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 = 𝛱
                                                   (7) 
Therefore, by the third step proposed at the beginning of this subsection, seeking the income 
distribution with the highest probability,  {𝑎𝑘
∗ }𝑘=1
𝑛 , is equivalent to solving the following 
maximization problem (Tao 2013): 
{
: 𝛺({𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 ){𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1𝑛
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑠. 𝑡. ∑ 𝑎𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 = 𝑁
∑ 𝑎𝑘𝜀𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 = 𝛱
                                                     (8) 
4. The results 
By the Lemma 6.2 in Tao (2013), the maximization problem (8) is equivalent to the following 
problem: 
{
: 𝑙𝑛𝛺({𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 ){𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1𝑛
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑠. 𝑡. ∑ 𝑎𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 = 𝑁
∑ 𝑎𝑘𝜀𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 = 𝛱
                                                   (9) 
Substituting (7) into (9) we obtain the income distribution with the highest probability (in fact, 
denoted by the probability which tends to one7): 
𝑎𝑘 =
1
𝑒𝛼+𝛽𝜀𝑘
                                                            (10) 
where 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, and α ≤ 0, β ≥ 0 (see Tao (2010, 2013)). The complete solutions will be 
given in Appendix B. 
The exponential distribution (10) is also called the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution. It is worth 
mentioning that due to the Fairness Axiom 1, equation (10) arises because the society is assumed 
                                                        
7 It is easy to check that when N → ∞ by the formula (7) the “highest probability” (Tao 2013), P[{𝑎𝑘
∗ }𝑘=1
𝑛 ] =
𝛺({𝑎𝑘
∗ }𝑘=1
𝑛 )
∑ 𝛺({𝑎𝑘
′ }
𝑘=1
𝑛
)
{𝑎𝑘
′ }
𝑘=1
𝑛
, will tend to 1, where we denote by P[𝑋] the probability that an event X occurs. By Tao’s 
spontaneous order theory, the exponential distribution (10) is obviously a spontaneous order in the sense of 
collective behaviors about income allocations (Tao 2013). 
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to be absolutely fair. However, the human society cannot be absolutely fair, so the exponential 
distribution (10) may be only suitable for a part of the population. Indeed, Yakovenko et al. (2009) 
use the income data from U.S. in 1983–2000, and confirm that the income of the majority of 
population (lower class) obey the exponential distribution (or Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution), see 
Figure 1. Not coincidently, Nirei et al. (2007) also find the same empirical result by using the 
income data from Japan, see Figure 2. 
Moreover, from Figures 1 and 2 we further notice that the income of a small fraction of 
population (upper class) in the society obeys Pareto distribution (or power distribution). It is well 
known that, Pareto distribution can be derived using some unfair rules, e.g., the rule of “The rich 
get richer” (Barabasi, 1999). By the same method proposed by Barabasi (1999), we can easily get 
Pareto’s income distribution (Tao 2014): 
𝑎𝑘 = 𝜀𝑘
−𝛾−1
,                                                             (11) 
where 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, and γ ≥ 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Reprinted from Yakovenko et al. (2009). Points represent the Internal Revenue Service data, and 
solid lines are fits to Boltzmann-Gibbs and Pareto distributions. 
 
 
Figure 2: Reprinted from Nirei et al. (2007). Income distributions in the U.S. and Japan in 1999. 
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4.2 The alarming level of Gini coefficient 
On the one hand, by the discussion of section 3.1, we know that the exponential distribution 
(10) can be regarded as a signal of indicating social fairness, since it is a result of Rawls’ principle 
of fair equality of opportunity.  
On the other hand, the exponential distribution obeys Pareto optimality as well, since by 
Definition 2, it is a set of equilibrium income allocations, each of which is Pareto optimal. 
To sum up, the exponential distribution (10) not only ensures efficiency but also guarantees 
fairness, and therefore can be regarded as a signal of indicating social stability. Due to this, we can 
specify the maximal value of the Gini coefficient of the exponential distribution (10) as the 
potential alarming level. 
Next we attempt to calculate the Gini coefficients of the exponential distribution (10) and 
Pareto distribution (11) respectively. To this end, let us rewrite (10) and (11) in the form of 
continuous functions: 
𝑓𝐵(𝜀) = {
𝛽𝑒
−𝛽(𝜀+
𝛼
𝛽
)
, 𝜀 ≥ −
𝛼
𝛽
     0,            𝜀 < −
𝛼
𝛽
                                              (12)  
𝑓𝑃(𝜀) = {
𝛾𝑎𝛾𝜀−𝛾−1, 𝜀 ≥ 𝑎
    0,           𝜀 < 𝑎
,                                                 (13) 
where, 𝑓𝐵(𝜀) and 𝑓𝑃(𝜀) correspond to exponential distribution (10) and Pareto distribution (11) 
respectively, and 𝜀 represents the continuous variable describing the possible income level. 
By the techniques proposed in Appendix C, we can calculate the Gini coefficients of the 
exponential distribution 𝑓𝐵(𝜀) and the Pareto distribution 𝑓𝑃(𝜀) separately as follows: 
𝐺𝐵 =
1
2(1−𝛼)
,                                                            (14) 
𝐺𝑃 =
1
2𝛾−1
,                                                              (15) 
We know that 𝛼 ≤ 0, 𝛾 ≥ 1, so the intervals of Gini coefficients 𝐺𝐵 and 𝐺𝑃 are: 
0 ≤ 𝐺𝐵 ≤ 0.5,                                                           (16) 
0 ≤ 𝐺𝑃 ≤ 1,                                                             (17) 
By expression (16) we surprisingly find that the exponential distribution (10) rules out the 
extreme inequality, for example, the equilibrium income allocation (𝛱, 0, … ,0) (whose Gini 
coefficient equals 1) is ruled out. However, by expression (17) we note that the Pareto distribution 
(11) cannot rule out the allocation (𝛱, 0, … ,0). This is because the exponential distribution (10) is 
a result based on the Fairness Axiom 1 but the Pareto distribution (11) is a result based on the 
“The rich get richer” rule which may involve unfair behaviors. 
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Since the exponential distribution (10) not only ensures efficiency8 but also guarantees 
fairness, it can be regarded as a powerful signal of indicating social stability in the viewpoint of 
normative economics. This means, the income follows the exponential distribution implies that the 
society is stable. As we have shown in expression (16), when income follows the exponential 
distribution, and the world is free of extreme inequality, the scope of the corresponding Gini 
coefficient lies in the interval between 0 and 0.5, so once the Gini coefficient lies in this interval, 
the society is stable in a large way. Whenever the value goes out of this scope, that is, it is larger 
than the maximal value, instability may occur.  
We have known that the derivation of the Pareto distribution (11) is based on the unfair and 
non-equilibrium rules (i.e., some rules like “The rich get richer”), so we cannot guarantee that a 
society whose income follows power distribution will be fair at least in Rawls’ sense. That is to 
say, we cannot guarantee that every member in such a society will have an equal chance of 
occupying any given income level. Although the Pareto distribution (11) may ensure efficiency, it 
contradicts social fairness at least in Rawls’ sense. As a result, under Rawls’ fairness perspective, 
the alarming level of Gini coefficient should be only considered when income follows exponential 
distribution. 
So we specify the maximal value of Gini coefficient 𝐺𝐵 when income follows exponential 
distribution, which equals 0.5, as a minimal basic reference point of the alarming level, clearly 
violating the international standard 0.4. We will give the empirical evidence in the next section.  
5. Some empirical evidence 
In this section, we report some empirical results that support the theoretical predictions of our 
model. To test the implications of the model we use a sub-sample of the World Bank’s PovcalNet 
database that allows us to analyze some aspects of the alarming level of Gini coefficient and to 
understand the role played by the alarming on economic uncertainty. 
5.1. Data description and methodology 
Before presenting the data and methods of our empirical studies, we need to make the 
following assumption and proposition, which are the foundations of our proceeding investigations. 
Assumption 1: In times of peace, the political instability around the world is a small 
probability event. 
Proposition 3: If there are no political or economic interventions among countries, the 
distribution of Gini coefficients follows the normal distribution.  
Proof. See Appendix D. □ 
Assumption 1 just states that in times of peace, only very small number of countries may 
experience the political instability. We do not rule out the possibility of the emergence of political 
instability, but just think that the instability is not a system event. Put in a statistical way, if the 
sample size is big enough, the observations undergo political instability are only some negligible 
outliers. So we can fit some stable distributions on the data and use the statistical decision theory 
to make the inference.  
                                                        
8 By Definition 2 we note that the exponential distribution (10) consists of the equilibrium income allocations, and 
hence lies in the core of the economy, another strand of literature from game theory also proves the akin argument 
(see, e.g., Howe and Roemer, 1981) 
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Proposition 3 implies that the Gini coefficient follows stable normal distribution when the 
sample size is big enough, and large adverse shocks are very rare. In fact, only when the samples 
follow some stable distributions can we make credible statistical inferences, or conclusions based 
on unstable distributions are not reliable.  
The sample in our study includes data from more than 130 countries all over the world that 
cover different stages of economic development and time spans. However, due to the availability 
of data, we can only collect the relative fully data sets from four separate years, that is: 1990, 1995, 
2000 and 2005. In 1990, we get 130 observations, while in 1995, it is 137, and in 2000, 2005, the 
observations are 139 and 140 separately. All the data are in the form of percentage. 
The only variable in our empirical study is the Gini coefficient, which are collected from 
Word Bank Database. In order to test our hypothesis, we first resort to the Jarque-Bera Chi-square 
statistic to test the normality of the data, and then under the stable empirical distribution, we use 
the statistical decision theory to detect the alarming level. 
The test statistic for normality of observations was proposed by Jarque and Bera (1980, 1987). 
The statistic can be written as follows: 
𝐽𝐵 =
𝑛
6
(𝑆2 +
1
4
(𝐾 − 3)2),                                                  (18) 
where 𝑛 is the number of observations (or degrees of freedom in general); 𝑆 is the sample 
skewness, and 𝐾 is the sample kurtosis. If the data comes from a normal distribution, the 𝐽𝐵 
statistic asymptotically has a chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom, so the statistic 
can be used to test the hypothesis that the data are from a normal distribution. The null hypothesis 
is a joint hypothesis of the skewness being zero and the excess kurtosis being zero. Samples from 
a normal distribution have an expected skewness of zero and an expected excess kurtosis of zero 
(which is the same as a kurtosis of 3). As the definition of 𝐽𝐵 shows, any deviation from this 
increases the 𝐽𝐵 statistic. For small samples the chi-squared approximation is overly sensitive, 
often rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in fact true. Furthermore, the distribution of p-values 
departs from a uniform distribution and becomes a right-skewed uni-modal distribution, especially 
for small p-values. This leads to a large Type I error rate. So, to circumvent the small sample 
problem, we desert the data sets whose observations are small, and choose some representative 
years when the sample size is relatively large. 
In regarding to the alarming level of the Gini coefficient, we follow the approach of classical 
statistical decision theory, that is, the so-called three-sigma rule (Bartoszynsk and 
Niewiadomska-Buga, 2008). According to the rule, we are allowed to disregard the possibility of a 
random variable deviating from its mean more than three standard deviations. Namely, if 
𝑋~𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎2), where 𝜇 is the mean, 𝜎2 is the variance, then 
𝑃{|𝑋 − 𝜇| > 3𝜎} = 𝑃 {|
𝑋−𝜇
𝜎
| > 3} = 0.0026.                                  (19) 
From equation (19), we know that for any random variable sampled from normal distribution, 
the probability that it will deviate from its mean by more than three standard deviations is about 
3‰, which is, at most, very small and negligible. Consider that the symmetric feature of the 
normal distribution, and what we care in this paper is the right tail, the probability becomes even 
smaller, 1.5‰. so this rule is helpful for us to drop some outliers in the sample, while at the same 
time without losing much information, but in this paper, our purpose is to detect the alarming level 
of Gini coefficient, rather than making observation selection, so we make some compromises on 
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the rule and use a variant–the two-sigma rule, that is, we treat the random variables deviating from 
their means more than two standard deviations as the small probability events, meaning that the 
occurrence of the events are possible, though not probable. Following the same formula as 
equation (19), we can easily find that the probability of a random variable deviating from its mean 
more than two standard deviations is 0.0455, in the right tail, it is 0.0228. Any events happening at 
this or smaller probabilities, we regard them as the small probability events. Based on this 
argument, we can calculate the critical value of the alarming of Gini coefficient empirically. The 
happening of small probability events implies that some countries are undergoing unstable 
systems, showing that economic or political crisis may emerge. 
5.2 Empirical results: A tale of two worlds 
In order to verify and examine the predictions of our theory, we follow the methods of 
distribution fitting and normality test just proposed, the statistical tests are reported in Figure 3–6. 
Each figure depicts the results of this exercise for the four separate years. 
We start by considering the empirical distribution of the data. As the Figure 3–6 shows, 
which reports the Jarque-Bera chi-squared statistic and the corresponding p-values for all the cases 
studied. Next we turn to the alarming level of the Gini coefficient. The calculation method is just 
the two-sigma rule. Just like the three-sigma rule, we use the following formula: 
𝑃{|𝑋 − 𝜇| > 2𝜎} = 𝑃 {|
𝑋−𝜇
𝜎
| > 2} = 0.0455, 
So 𝑋 = 𝜇 + 2𝜎 is just the critical value, we only consider the right tail of the distribution, so 
when the real data is larger than this value, the small probability event happens, showing that the 
country or society begins to go to unstable. 
5.2.1 World in 1990 
In the year of 1990, the summary statistics of Gini coefficient presented in Figure 3 show that 
the null hypothesis of normality of the distribution can be rejected at the usual 5% marginal 
significance level. This result is very interesting and insightful, while at the same time, consistent 
with our theory prediction (see proposition 3). The history of 1990 across the world was in fact 
very dark and full of uncertainty, politics and economy went into chaos, a series of astonishing 
incidents occurred, such as the reunification of Germany, the Gulf war and the Baltic states 
declaring independence from the Soviet Union, et al., to name a few. When all these events 
reflected in the data, the result is that the Gini coefficient no long follows a stable normal 
distribution. Due to this, we have no way to calculate the alarming level, so we do not report the 
value in this year. Although the mean of the Gini coefficient in 1990 is smaller than that of the 
other years, the standard deviation is much larger, a signal of unstable.  
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Figure 3: The histogram and summary statistics of Gini coefficient in 1990 
5.2.2 World in 1995, 2000, and 2005 
When it comes to the year of 1995, 2000, and 2005, it is very clear that the null hypothesis of 
normality of the distribution cannot be rejected at the usual 5% marginal significance level, in fact, 
the P-value reported in these three years are all larger than 10%, a strong signal that the null 
hypothesis should not be rejected. Rather than 1990, the world economy and politics in 1995, 
2000, and 2005 were in the states of euphoria.  
 
Figure 4: The histogram and summary statistics of Gini coefficient in 1995 
 
Figure 5: The histogram and summary statistics of Gini coefficient in 2000 
0
4
8
12
16
20
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Series: GINI1990
Sample 1 130
Observations 130
Mean       0.372300
Median   0.359000
Maximum  0.708000
Minimum  0.170000
Std. Dev.   0.116603
Skewness   0.435859
Kurtosis   2.405336
Jarque-Bera  6.031552
Probability  0.049008
0
4
8
12
16
20
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Series: GINI1995
Sample 1 137
Observations 137
Mean       0.394139
Median   0.383000
Maximum  0.670000
Minimum  0.217000
Std. Dev.   0.097778
Skewness   0.353400
Kurtosis   2.544595
Jarque-Bera  4.035570
Probability  0.132950
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Series: GINI2000
Sample 1 139
Observations 139
Mean       0.392885
Median   0.392000
Maximum  0.654000
Minimum  0.225000
Std. Dev.   0.090282
Skewness   0.234556
Kurtosis   2.497319
Jarque-Bera  2.738029
Probability  0.254357
 15 
 
 
Figure 6: The histogram and summary statistics of Gini coefficient in 2005 
The normality distribution tests in Figure 4–6 implies stable distributions exist in 1995, 2000, 
and 2005. So we can calculate the alarming level of Gini coefficients for the three years. Resorting 
to a little computation, the values are 0.579695, 0.573449, and 0.560313，corresponding separately 
to the year of 1995, 2000, and 2005. The results are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: The alarming levels of Gini coefficient 
Year Alarming level of Gini coefficient 
1995 0.579695 
2000 0.573449 
2005 0.560313 
Note: The data of Gini coefficient in 1990 no longer follows normal distribution at the 5% significance level, 
so the alarming level is not reported. 
 Although the choice of data (they are spanned by 5 years) makes it difficult to establish a 
link between the economy and politics uncertainty, it seems possible to find a relationship between 
the above-stated coefficients and the fluctuations of economic activity. As one can recognize from 
the calculation, the critical values of Gini coefficients, inferred from the numerical fitting, tend to 
decrease in our sample periods, the degree of stability around the world in fact decreases. 
The distribution and the critical values of the Gini coefficient we presented in this section are 
clearly compatible with our theory. From the Figures 3–6 above, one can see that in normal years, 
the distributions of the data are very stable, while in the turbulent year, the stable distribution no 
longer exists. As for the alarming level, in contrast to the international standard, no one coefficient 
lies around 0.4, in fact, they are all much larger. Our results show that the traditional measuring of 
the alarming level is intrinsically fault, in our sample, 0.4 is just the mean of the Gini coefficients, 
implies that it is the most probable value, rather than the critical value, so the traditional standard 
cannot fully reflect the facts of income or wealth inequality.  
In summary, the proposition that the alarming level of Gini coefficient at least equal or larger 
than 0.5 is in agreement with our empirical observations, thus, when Gini coefficient goes up, but 
not yet cross the alarming level, the government should pay more attention to the economic 
development, rather than inequality alleviation. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
We set out in this paper to shed light on Rawl’s fairness, income distribution and the alarming 
level of Gini coefficient both in a theoretical and empirical perspective. Due to the lacking of rigid 
theory on the traditional argument of the alarming level of the Gini coefficient, we develop a 
theoretical model that captures the essence of Rawls’ fairness and income distribution under the 
general equilibrium framework. Based on the model, we get the theoretical critical value of 
alarming level of Gini coefficient.  
In the theoretical model, the income distribution we derived from the general equilibrium 
model not only satisfies Rawls’ fairness but also stays in the core of the economy, and the 
distribution follows the exponential distribution exactly. To put it in another way, the exponential 
distribution satisfies the Pareto optimality, while at the same time, conforms to Rawls’ fairness, it 
is the direct result of the fair competition in the society. However, when it comes to the reality, the 
problem arises: human society can never be absolutely fair, so we conjecture that in countries with 
mature and sound legal systems and democratic regimes, the majority of the population, their 
income follows the exponential distribution; while for the minority of the people, their income 
level follows non-fair distribution, according to the usual “the rich get richer” rule, which is 
obviously non-fair, we know that the distribution is the Pareto distribution. 
In fact, our theoretical predictions are supported by empirical facts. Studies on the income 
distribution of the U.S. and Japan show that in both countries the income of the majority of the 
people follows the exponential distribution, while the income of the minority follows the Pareto 
distribution, meaning that the income distribution in a society is of two forms. So our theoretical 
assertions are confirmed. 
Based on the theoretical predictions obtained from our model, we test the theory using the 
data of the Gini coefficient collected from all kinds of countries all over the world in four separate 
years. We first show that the distributions of Gini coefficient all over the world are normal 
distributed in the states of euphoria, while in the turbulent year, it is no longer following a stable 
normal distribution. This result presents an implication for seeking the potential alarming level of 
Gini coefficient when regional conflict is a small probability event in the peaceful world, but when 
the world undergo radical changes or turbulences, the level cannot be calculated from a stable 
distribution. Next we calculate the alarming levels of Gini coefficients from three years data, that 
is, 1995, 2000, and 2005, using the statistical decision theory. The results suggest that the alarming 
levels are not only much larger than 0.4, but also larger 0.5, supporting the proposal posed in our 
theoretical model. An interesting exception is that in 1990, the Gini coefficient no longer follows 
the normal distribution at the 5% significance level, though not appropriate, we still informally 
calculate the alarming level under normal distribution using the two sigma rule, the value is 
0.605506, implying that when a country’s Gini coefficient is larger than 0.6, it is going to become 
more unstable, just like the year of 1990. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
In this appendix, we attempt to divide the multiple equilibrium income allocations, that is, the 
equation (5), into different income distributions. For the sake of simplicity, we drop the constraint 
∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝛱 temporarily. 
Let’s first consider a simple case with only two heterogeneous consumers: 
Example 1: Two consumers and two possible income levels: 𝜀1 < 𝜀2. 
We first explore how many equilibrium income allocations will example 1 have. Due to the 
fact that there are only two consumers, we need to count all the possible income allocations 
(𝑅1, 𝑅2) satisfying equation (6) for 𝑁 = 2. However, because the constraint ∑ 𝑅𝑖 = 𝛱
2
𝑖=1  has 
assumed to be temporarily dropped, we only need to count all possible income allocations 
(𝑅1, 𝑅2)  satisfying 𝑅𝑖 ≥ 0  for 𝑖 = 1,2 . As a result, there are four equilibrium income 
allocations:  
𝐴1 = (𝜀2, 𝜀2), 𝐴2 = (𝜀1, 𝜀2), 𝐴3 = (𝜀2, 𝜀1), 𝐴4 = (𝜀1, 𝜀1). 
 
 
 
𝜀2      1       2      
 
  
𝜀1  
          𝐴1  
Figure 7: Equilibrium income allocation 𝐴1: consumers 1 and 2 obtains 𝜀2 units of income respectively. 
𝜀2          2                      𝜀2         1 
 
 
𝜀1          1                      𝜀1         2 
 
           𝐴2                                 𝐴3 
Figure 8: Equilibrium income allocation 𝐴2: consumer 1 obtains 𝜀1 units of income; consumer 2 obtains 𝜀2 
units of income. Equilibrium income allocation 𝐴3: consumer 1 obtains 𝜀2 units of income; consumer 2 obtains 
𝜀1 units of income. 
𝜀2  
 
  
𝜀1       1       2  
 
           𝐴4  
Figure 9: Equilibrium income allocation 𝐴4: consumers 1 and 2 obtain 𝜀1 units of income respectively. 
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If we denote a consumer by a ball, then each equilibrium income allocation 𝐴𝑖(𝑖 = 1,2,3,4) 
can be shown by a figure, see Figure 7–9. For example, the Figure 7 depicts the equilibrium 
income allocation 𝐴1 in which consumers 1 and 2 obtain 𝜀2 units of income respectively, where 
the ball 1 stands for consumer 1 and ball 2 stands for consumer 2. 
Now we know that the Example 1 has four possible equilibrium income allocations: 𝐴1, 𝐴2, 
𝐴3 and 𝐴4; each of which can be shown by a figure. If one observes the Figures 7–9 carefully, 
then one may find that these four equilibrium allocations can be divided into three different groups. 
To see this, we consider an ordered pair {𝑎1, 𝑎2}, where 𝑎1  represents that there are 𝑎1 
consumers each of who obtains 𝜀1  units of income, and 𝑎2  represents that there are 𝑎2 
consumers each of who obtain 𝜀2 units of income. Adopting this notion, one easily finds that the 
Figures 7–9 can be just denoted by {𝑎1 = 0, 𝑎2 = 2}, {𝑎1 = 1, 𝑎2 = 1} and {𝑎1 = 2, 𝑎2 = 0} 
respectively.  
It is easy to see that 𝐴2 and 𝐴3 will obey a unified rule: One consumer obtains 𝜀1 units of 
income and the other obtains 𝜀2 units of income. Therefore, both 𝐴2 and 𝐴3 satisfy the ordered 
pair {𝑎1 = 1, 𝑎2 = 1}. This means that an ordered pair {𝑎1, 𝑎2} can be thought of as a ‘set’ 
whose elements are equilibrium income allocations. For example, 𝐴2 and 𝐴3 obey the ordered 
pair {𝑎1 = 1, 𝑎2 = 1}, so we get: 
{𝑎1 = 1, 𝑎2 = 1} = {𝐴2, 𝐴3}.                                            (A.1)  
   Similarly, we have: 
{𝑎1 = 0, 𝑎2 = 2} = {𝐴1}.                                               (A.2) 
{𝑎1 = 2, 𝑎2 = 0} = {𝐴4}.                                               (A.3) 
If we extend the analysis of two consumers to 𝑁 consumers, then we have the definition 
about income distribution; that is, the Definition 2 in sub-section 3.2. 
We denote the number of elements in a given income distribution {𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛  by 𝛺({𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 ). 
For the case of heterogeneous consumers, by Boltzmann statistics method (Tao; 2010, 2013), we 
immediately know that the number of elements in a given income distribution {𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛  is denoted 
by:  
𝛺({𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 ) =
𝑁!
∏ 𝑎𝑘!
𝑛
𝑘=1
.                                                 (A.4) 
Example 1 indicates that 𝑁 = 2 and 𝑛 = 2. Thus, using the formula (A.4) we can compute 
the number of elements in each income distribution as follows: 
𝛺({𝑎1 = 0, 𝑎2 = 2}) =
2!
0!×2!
= 1,                                         (A.5) 
 𝛺({𝑎1 = 1, 𝑎2 = 1}) =
2!
1!×1!
= 2,                                         (A.6) 
𝛺({𝑎1 = 2, 𝑎2 = 0}) =
2!
2!×0!
= 1,                                          (A.7) 
Clearly, the results (A.5)-(A.7) are consistent with the numbers of equilibrium income 
allocations listed by Figures 7–9 respectively. 
Let us now recover the constraint ∑ 𝑅𝑖 = 𝛱
𝑁
𝑖=1 , so the correct expression of 𝛺({𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 ) can 
be expressed as follows: 
 {
𝛺({𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 ) =
𝑁!
∏ 𝑎𝑘!
𝑛
𝑘=1
∑ 𝑎𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 = 𝑁
∑ 𝑎𝑘𝜀𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 = 𝛱
                                                  (A.8) 
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Appendix B 
In this appendix, we will derive the solutions of equation (9). 
By the formula (A.4), the function 𝑙𝑛𝛺({𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 ) can be written in the form: 
 𝑙𝑛𝛺({𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 ) = 𝑙𝑛𝑁! − ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑘!
𝑛
𝑘=1 .                                       (B.1) 
   Due to the fact that the value of 𝑎𝑘 is large enough, using the Stirling's formula (Carter, 2001; 
Page 218): 
 𝑙𝑛𝑚! = 𝑚(𝑙𝑛𝑚 − 1), (𝑚 ≫ 1),                                          (B.2) 
   the equation (B.1) can be rewritten in the form:  
𝑙𝑛𝛺({𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 ) = 𝑁(𝑙𝑛𝑁 − 1) − ∑ 𝑎𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑘 − 1)
𝑛
𝑘=1 .                           (B.3) 
   The method of Lagrange multiplier for the optimal problem (9) gives  
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝛺({𝑎𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑎𝑘
− 𝛼
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑎𝑘
− 𝛽
𝜕𝛱
𝜕𝑎𝑘
= 0, 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑛                               (B.4) 
Substituting (B.3) into (B.4) we obtain the income distribution with the highest probability:  
𝑎𝑘 =
1
𝑒𝛼+𝛽𝜀𝑘
, 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑛.                                                 (B.5) 
where α ≤ 0 and β ≥ 0 (Tao 2010, 2013). 
Appendix C 
In this appendix, we will derive the expression of the Gini coefficient under exponential and 
Pareto distribution respectively, that is, the equation (14) and (15). 
We assume that the income level 𝑥 in an arbitrary country is a continuous variable, and lies in 
a closed interval [𝑎, 𝑏], where 𝑎 ≥ 0 and 𝑏 < +∞, the probability density function (PDF) is 
𝑓(𝑥), while the cumulative distribution function (CDF) is 𝐹(𝑥), according to the definitions of 
probability distribution, 𝐹(𝑥) is the percentage of population whose income less than 𝑥, that is: 
𝐹(𝑥) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)
𝑥
𝑎
𝑑𝑡.                                                       (C.1) 
Then the mean of the income 𝜇
 
is: 
𝜇 = ∫ 𝑥𝑓(𝑥)
𝑏
𝑎
𝑑𝑥.                                                        (C.2) 
Under the settings assumed above, the formula for calculating the much-used Gini coefficient 
𝐺 can be written as (see, for example, Lambert, 1993, p. 43): 
𝐺 =
2
𝜇
∫ 𝑥 [𝐹(𝑥) −
1
2
]
𝑏
𝑎
𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥.                                              (C.3) 
Now we use the formula (C.3) to calculate the Gini coefficients of exponential distribution 
and power distribution respectively. 
By equation (12) the exponential distribution is as follow: 
𝑓𝐵(𝑥) = {𝛽𝑒
−𝛽(𝑥+
𝛼
𝛽
)
, 𝑥 ≥ 𝑎
       0,            𝑥 < 𝑎
,                                               (C.4) 
where 𝛼 ≤ 0, 𝛽 ≥ 0 and 𝑎 = −
𝛼
𝛽
.  
Substituting (C.4) into (C.3) and by order b → ∞ we obtain: 
𝐺𝐵 =
1
2(1−𝛼)
.                                                            (C.5) 
By (13) the power distribution is as follow: 
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𝑓(𝑥) = {
𝛾𝑎𝛾𝑥−𝛾−1,   𝛾 ≥ 𝑎
     0,             𝛾 < 𝑎
,                                                (C.6) 
where γ ≥ 1.              
Substituting (C.6) into (C.3) and by order b → ∞ we obtain: 
𝐺𝑃 =
1
2𝛾−1
.                                                              (C.7) 
Appendix D 
In this appendix, we complete the proof of the Proposition 3 in the manner by which Gauss 
(1809) shows that the measurement error obeys normal distribution. 
In a market-oriented economy, it is naturally supposed that by the “invisible hand” the 
economy would tend to a desirable Gini coefficient. We can denote the desirable Gini coefficient 
by GD. However, there would be many and many different factors which force the actual Gini 
coefficient to deviate from the desirable Gini coefficient. For example, there are different resource 
endowments among countries, so that the distribution of Gini coefficients among countries may be 
non-uniform. Thus, we denote by 𝐺1, 𝐺2,…, 𝐺𝑛 the samples of n different countries’ Gini 
coefficients.  
Now we assume that 𝐺𝑖 is independent of 𝐺𝑗 for any i ≠ j. This means that there are no 
political or economic interventions among countries.  
Denote by 𝜀𝑖 = 𝐺𝑖 − G𝐷  for i = 1, … , n  the deviation of every single country’s Gini 
coefficient from the desirable Gini coefficient. Suppose 𝜀𝑖 's distribution density function is 𝑓(𝜀𝑖), 
then the joint density function for all observations is  
𝐿(𝐺𝐷) = 𝐿(𝐺𝐷; 𝐺1, … , 𝐺𝑛 ) = ∏ 𝑓(𝜀𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 = ∏ 𝑓(𝐺𝑖 − 𝐺𝐷)
𝑛
𝑖=1                      (D.1)                                                                                                                      
Set  
𝑑 log 𝐿(𝐺𝐷)
𝑑𝐺𝐷
= 0                                                           (D.2)                                                                                 
Rearranging (D.2) as 
 ∑
𝑓′(𝐺𝑖−𝐺𝐷)
𝑓(𝐺𝑖−𝐺𝐷)
= 0𝑛𝑖=1                                                        (D.3)                                                                           
Substituting 𝑔(G𝑖 − 𝐺𝐷) =
𝑓′(𝐺𝑖−𝐺𝐷)
𝑓(𝐺𝑖−𝐺𝐷)
 into (D.3) yields 
∑ 𝑔(𝐺𝑖 − 𝐺𝐷) = 0
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                      (D.4)                                                                                                                            
We assume that the solution governed by maximum likelihood estimation is exactly the 
arithmetic average. So we plug arithmetic average of Gini coefficient-?̅? into (D.4) and obtain 
∑ 𝑔(𝐺𝑖 − ?̅?) = 0
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                       (D.5)                                                                           
If we set n = 2, then we have  
𝑔(𝐺1 − ?̅?) + 𝑔(𝐺2 − ?̅?) = 0                                               (D.6)                                                                     
It is easy to see (𝐺1 − ?̅?) = −(𝐺2 − ?̅?). Since 𝐺1 and 𝐺2 are arbitrary, then we get 
𝑔(−𝜀) = −𝑔(𝜀)                                                         (D.7)                                                                                                                                   
We set n = m + 1 in (D.5) and meanwhile let 𝜀1 = ⋯ 𝜀𝑚 = −𝜀 and 𝜀𝑚+1 = 𝑚𝜀 so that 
𝜀̅ = 0, then we have  
∑ 𝑔(𝐺𝑖 − ?̅?) = 𝑚𝑔(−𝜀)
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑔(𝑚𝜀)                                        (D.8)                                                               
Substituting (D.5) and (D.7) into (D.8) yields 
𝑔(𝑚𝜀) = 𝑚𝑔(𝜀)                                                         (D.9)                                                                                 
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The only continuous function ( )g   satisfying (D.9) is 𝑔(𝜀) = 𝑐𝜀, so we get  
𝑓(𝜀) = 𝑀𝑒𝑐𝜀
2
                                                         (D.10)                                                                                   
Due to ∫ 𝑓(𝜀)𝑑𝜀
+∞
−∞
= 1 finally we have 
𝑓(𝜀) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎2
𝑒−
𝜀2
2𝜎2                                                     (D.11)                                                                                
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